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The Power Process and Emotion
Abstract
[Excerpt] Power is a crucial phenomenon in organizations, both pervasive and somewhat elusive. The study of
power in organizations has a long tradition (Crozier 1964), yet the literature on power is fragmented and has
been a central focus only intermittently over time. Fundamental assumptions about the role of power vary
widely. On the one hand, power can be construed broadly as a negative and divisive force in relations, groups,
and organizations. It enables those having power to exert influence over or command the compliance of others
through coercion, force, and threats. This is the punitive, manipulative face of power (Deutsch and Krauss
1962; Lawler et al. 1988; Tedeschi et al. 1973). On the other hand, power can be construed as a positive,
integrative force enabling those with power to provide rewards, inducements, and reinforcements to others
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Boulding 1989). It gives those with power the opportunity to promote
cooperation and collaboration. The negative view of power emphasizes the harm it can do and the resistance it
can generate, whereas the positive view of power emphasizes the role of power in mobilizing concerted action
toward collective goals. Implicitly, negative and positive emotions (e.g., pleasure, enthusiasm, pride or anger,
fear, sadness) are likely to be associated, respectively, with the negative and positive faces of power. This
chapter proposes a power-process model for examining the relationship between power and emotion.
Keywords
power process, emotion, organizations, power, negotiation
Disciplines
Labor Relations | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Social Psychology and Interaction | Work, Economy
and Organizations
Comments
Suggested Citation
Lawler, E. J. & Proell, C. A. (2001). The power process and emotion [Electronic version]. In D. Tjosvold & B.
van Knippenberg (Eds.) Power and interdependence in organizations (pp.169-185). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Required Publisher Statement
© Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/651
The power process and emotion 
E D W A R D J . LAWLER AND C H A D A. P R O E L L 
Introduction 
Power is a crucial phenomenon in organizations, both pervasive and 
somewhat elusive. The study of power in organizations has a long 
tradition (Crozier 1964), yet the literature on power is fragmented and 
has been a central focus only intermittently over time. Fundamental 
assumptions about the role of power vary widely. On the one hand, 
power can be construed broadly as a negative and divisive force in 
relations, groups, and organizations. It enables those having power to 
exert influence over or command the compliance of others through 
coercion, force, and threats. This is the punitive, manipulative face of 
power (Deutsch and Krauss 1962; Lawler et al. 1988; Tedeschi et al. 
1973). On the other hand, power can be construed as a positive, 
integrative force enabling those with power to provide rewards, 
inducements, and reinforcements to others (Bacharach and Lawler 
1980; Boulding 1989). It gives those with power the opportunity to 
promote cooperation and collaboration. The negative view of power 
emphasizes the harm it can do and the resistance it can generate, 
whereas the positive view of power emphasizes the role of power in 
mobilizing concerted action toward collective goals. Implicitly, nega-
tive and positive emotions (e.g., pleasure, enthusiasm, pride or anger, 
fear, sadness) are likely to be associated, respectively, with the nega-
tive and positive faces of power. This chapter proposes a power-
process model for examining the relationship between power and 
emotion. 
Recent work on power and emotion can be found within three dis-
parate lines of theory and research: 
1. social-exchange theory in sociology (Lawler and Thye 1999); 
2. "approach inhibition" theory in psychology (Keltner et al. 2003); 
3. research on negotiations from organizational behavior (Carnevale 
and Isen 1986). 
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Unfortunately, these literatures have existed largely in isolation. This 
chapter draws ideas from each and fleshes out the role emotions play in 
power relations. We provide exemplars of research falling within these 
research traditions but, due to space limitations, we do not undertake a 
comprehensive review. Our purposes are primarily conceptual. This chap-
ter presents a power-process model designed to integrate elements from 
different approaches to power. In the context of this power-process model, 
we highlight some of the conclusions about power and emotion that can 
be drawn from work on power dependence structures, the approach/ 
inhibition effects of power, and the role of emotions, felt or expressed, in 
negotiation settings. We propose that the power-process model can not 
only integrate ideas from widely disparate literatures but also reveal gaps 
and suggest problems and issues for future study. 
The first step, however, is to define emotion. A review of the psycho-
logical and sociological literatures reveals an almost endless array of 
variation in how emotion, affect, feelings, moods, and sentiments are 
used (Lawler 2007). We adopt a commonly used definition of emotions 
as transitory positive or negative evaluative states with physiological, 
neurological, and cognitive components (Izard 1991; Kemper 1978). 
Emotions are a nonconscious response to external stimuli whereas feeling 
emotions involves at least a minimal awareness of the bodies' response 
to the stimuli (Damasio et al. 2000). We use the terms "emotions" and 
"feelings" interchangeably and focus on generalized emotions or feelings 
that people develop in interaction or exchange with others. Such emotions 
involve feeling good, feeling pleasure, or feeling happy, rather than more 
specific emotions directed at self or other such as pride or gratitude (Lawler 
2001; Weiner 1985). Affect is generally construed as a broader term than 
emotion (see Brief and Weiss 2002). It subsumes the generalized feelings of 
concern described here, as well as more enduring emotional states such as 
moods (which are diffuse feelings without targets) and sentiments (which 
target self, other, or groups) (Lawler 2007). Unless otherwise noted, we 
limit the scope of our analysis to short-term emotional states while recog-
nizing that in dealing with recurrent interactions or exchanges, the distinc-
tion between transitory and enduring affective states tends to blur. 
A power process model 
Most definitions of power focus on social power. What makes power 
social is that it is a property of a relationship between two or more 
The power process and emotion 171 
Feedback loop 
Figure 10.1 Power process model. 
individuals, i.e. to have power is to have power over someone else (Brass 
and Burkhardt 1993; Emerson 1962; French and Raven 1959; Ng 
1980). Most concepts of power also include one or more of the follow-
ing: (1) a capability or potential; (2) behaviors using that capability; 
(3) the impact of using the capability (actual or realized power and 
influence). The first typically involves a structure (e.g., network or 
hierarchy) within which a position provides an actor resources that 
are of value to one or more others (Cook and Emerson 1978; 
Emerson 1972). The second typically involves tactics or strategies 
designed to shape or change the behavior of another (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; Molm 1990). The third involves successful or unsuccess-
ful influence over that other. Lawler (1992) incorporated all three of 
these facets or dimensions into a "power process model" which informs 
this paper. This model is diagrammed in Figure 10.1. 
In the power-process model, eadh facet should be thought of as one 
"moment" of an integrated process. An actor faces a "problem" that 
involves influencing another; the actor has a resource (capability) that 
the other values, a range of behavioral options (tactics) for using this 
resource, and an outcome or result that is desired (Lawler 1992). Power 
capabilities underlie power use, and power use is the basis for actual 
power. One advantage of this model is that it makes fewer a-priori 
assumptions than most power frameworks, especially those that con-
flate power and its effects (see Dahl 1957). Rather than presuming that a 
capability is used, this model implies that there may be conditions under 
which having a capability is sufficient to influence another in the 
absence of power use. Whether or not it is used becomes a theoretical 
and empirical question. Rather than assuming that power produces 
results that favor the more powerful, the model implies that this 
depends on how the power is used (i.e. the tactics chosen) and the 
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amount and type of resistance generated by lower power actors. For 
example, low-power actors may have more influence than their power 
position would suggest because they are highly motivated to devise 
effective tactics (Bacharach and Lawler 1980), or because they more 
carefully process and weigh information on the high-power person 
(Fiske 1993). Thus, by making sharp distinctions between these com-
plementary facets of power, the power-process model poses questions 
that many other frameworks on power define away. 
An implication is that in almost any social relationship, individuals 
are likely to have some capacity to affect each other, a variety of options 
for using that capability, and an uncertain probability of success 
(Lawler 1992: 20). Emotions can enter the power process at all three 
points. If A has a power capability, it may arouse a fear of negative 
sanctions or the hope of positive reward; if A uses his or her power, the 
tactics chosen could affect the emotions felt by the other and perhaps 
those of the actor using the tactic; and if a successful result is generated, 
the emotions felt by self and other may depend on the degree that they 
each receive benefits from A's successful influence. The three moments 
of the power process and prospective emotional effects can be tied in 
part to underlying dependencies and interdependencies (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1980; Emerson 1972; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). These can be 
fruitfully analyzed from power-dependence theory (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; Emerson 1962, 1972). 
Power as dependence 
Power-dependence theory, developed originally by Emerson (1962, 
1972), is based on a very simple idea: The power of A is based on the 
dependence of B on A for valued outcomes, and vice versa. The degree 
of A's power over B depends on how much B values what A provides 
and the degree that B does not have alternative persons or relations from 
which to acquire these valued outcomes. The relational nature of power 
dependence emphasizes the point that power relations are two-way, 
involving mutual dependencies or interdependencies (see also Thibaut 
and Kelley 1959), and should be analyzed in these terms. 
Importantly, Emerson's (1972) framework implies a non-zero-sum 
conception of power in which each actor's power in a relation can grow 
or decline; thus an increase in one actor's power does not by definition 
reduce the other's power. Bacharach and Lawler (1981) developed the 
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non-zero-sum implications of Emerson's (1972) framework by distin-
guishing the relative power (dependence) of actors from the total power 
(dependence) in the relationship. Relative power refers to the degree of 
difference between A's dependence on B and B's dependence on A, 
whereas total power refers to the sum of each actor's dependence on 
the other (see also Molm 1987). Total power or dependence in a rela-
tion can vary because each actor's alternatives may contract or expand, 
and the value of the outcomes at stake also may grow or decline over 
time. Bacharach and Lawler (1981) use the distinction between relative 
and total power to develop the positive face of power. If actors have 
equal power and they build greater total power into their relationship, 
they have more to gain from repeated exchange or collaboration. They 
can accomplish joint goals together more effectively, more quickly, and 
with fewer costs. If actors have unequal power but increase the total 
power or dependence in their relationship, a similar result is likely to 
occur because there are stronger incentives for collaboration (Piskorski 
and Tiziana 2006). 
A non-zero-sum approach to power has implications for the emotions 
felt by actors in exchange. All things being equal, one would expect 
equal power dependence to generate more positive feelings about 
exchange with another than unequal power. Higher total power in 
the relation should also produce more positive emotions than lower 
total power. The rationale for the former is that equal power conditions 
avoid the issues of justice and legitimacy that tend to occur under 
unequal power conditions. The rationale for the latter is that the inter-
action or exchange generates greater joint gain. Overall, it is reasonable 
to hypothesize that equal power and high total power will enhance the 
total amount of positive affect in a relationship. Theory and research on 
relational cohesion suggests how this might occur. 
Relational cohesion 
Lawler and colleagues (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996) developed a 
theory of relational cohesion that incorporates both zero-sum and 
non-zero-sum components of power dependence and shows how each 
of these affect the emotions generated from social exchange. 
Specifically, they proposed that equal and high total power would 
generate more frequent exchange, and frequent or repeated exchanges 
would be a basis for enduring exchange relations because of emotions 
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generated by successful exchanges. This is theorized to occur because 
coming to an agreement is an accomplishment that makes the actors feel 
good. These positive emotions, when felt or experienced repeatedly, 
generate perceptions of a unifying, cohesive relation which the actors 
are then motivated to maintain net of the effects of the exchange out-
comes themselves (see Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). The result is 
commitment behavior directed at the social unit in question (the rela-
tion). A series of studies by Lawler and colleagues supports the predic-
tions of relational cohesion theory (e.g., Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and 
Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998). In sum, both equal and higher total power 
produce more positive emotions than unequal and lower total power, 
and these promote stronger relationships. 
It is important to point out, however, that repeated exchanges (fre-
quency) generate positive feelings and more cohesion/commitment even 
under most unequal power conditions (Lawler and Yoon 1998). As 
long as exchange generates positive emotions to some degree, repeated 
exchanges build relations even under unequal power (see Thye et al. 
2007). The only exception to this pattern has been when one actor has 
extremely low power; here exchanges do not generate positive emotions 
or feelings (see Lawler and Yoon 1998). In terms of the 
power-process model, this research shows how and when power poten-
tial promotes mutually felt positive emotions by repeatedly producing 
exchange outcomes. These emotional reactions shape whether actors 
attempt to maintain the relation over time. 
There also is research in the exchange tradition suggesting that under 
unequal power, the results of the power process have different emo-
tional effects on the low- and high-power actors (Lawler and Yoon 
1993; Molm 1997). With this in mind, Lovaglia and colleagues 
(Lovaglia 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Wilier 
et al. 1997) investigated the hypothesis that the exercise or demonstra-
tion of power should lead to enhanced status for the higher-power actor 
(Emerson 1962; Lovaglia 1994). The results indicated, however, that 
the relationship between power and status is complicated by the emo-
tional responses of the low-power actor to the exercise of power by the 
high-power actor. Specifically, if low-power actors reacted with nega-
tive emotions to the exercise of power (defined as garnering higher 
individual profits), this actually decreased the high-power actor's status 
and influence (Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Wilier et al. 1997). Thus, 
while Lawler and colleagues' work indicates that exchanges made under 
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unequal power conditions can generate positive emotions separate from 
the outcome and help to build collaborative relations, the work by 
Lovaglia and colleagues suggests that negative emotions from the 
results of exchange may obstruct this process. In terms of the 
power-process model, the important point is that realized power is 
connected to the generation of emotions, and these emotions produce 
feedback effects from the outcome to the future capability. 
Use of power 
The network-oriented power-dependence approach of Emerson (1972) 
tends to downplay the tactics of using power. Emerson assumes that if 
actors have power, they will use power, thereby conflating the first two 
moments of our power-process model (see Figure 10.1). Extant research 
explicitly on power and emotion has also downplayed tactics (see 
Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998); an exception is the work by 
Molm (1991, 1997) who has explicitly compared coercive and reward 
tactics by high- and low-power actors in a network. She found that 
coercive tactics evoke negative emotional reactions while reward tactics 
evoke positive emotions and, importantly, that the negative emotional 
responses to coercive tactics was stronger than the positive emotional 
responses to reward tactics. Moreover, she found that those in disad-
vantaged positions were more likely to use coercive tactics against 
the higher power actor than vice versa, and that those in a power-
advantaged position reacted more negatively to such coercion than 
those in a power-disadvantaged position (Molm 1997). 
Proell (2007) recently used the power-process model to explore an 
alternative approach to power and status from that of Lovaglia et al. 
(Lovaglia 1994, 1995a; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Wilier et al. 1997). 
Drawing upon the French and Raven (1959), Kipnis (Kipnis and 
Schmidt 1988; Kipnis et al. 1980) and Yukl (Yukl and Falbe 1990; 
Yukl and Tracey 1992) tradition of influence tactics, as well as Lawler's 
(1992) broad classification of tactics as positive (signaling cooperative 
motives) and negative (signaling competition), Proell found that the 
emotion generated from the exercise of power depended on the type 
of tactic used. Positive tactics, such as ingratiation, elicited more 
positive emotions, whereas negative tactics, such as coalitions, elicited 
more negative emotions. Moreover, reaction to the tactics depended 
upon the status of the person using the tactic. Coalition tactics by 
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high-status persons evoked more negative reactions from low-status 
targets than did coalition tactics of low status directed at high-status 
targets. Thus, it appears that both structurally determined power 
(Molm 1991) and the status of the actor using the tactic moderate 
emotional reactions to tactic use. 
In terms of the power-process model, both the work of Molm and 
Proell indicate that emotions are linked to the tactics chosen. This work 
also indicates why it is important to avoid the conflation of power 
potential and power use. Emotional reactions to tactics are partially 
contingent upon the circumstances surrounding the tactic use, including 
the power potential of the actor engaging in the tactic. Moreover, this 
research, combined with the findings of Lovaglia and colleagues (1996) 
and Lawler and colleagues (1993,1996,1998), underscores the import-
ance of the positive face of power. Negative tactics generate negative 
emotions which potentially undermine the stability of an exchange 
relationship, whereas positive tactics generate positive emotions which 
should reinforce an exchange relationship. Put differently, feedback 
loops involving positive emotions from tactics to power potential 
should strengthen an actor's future power potential, whereas negative 
feedback loops involving negative emotions should decrease that power 
potential and ultimately challenge the stability of an exchange 
relationship. 
One salient limitation of work in the exchange tradition is that little 
attention has been given to the spread of emotions across individuals, 
i.e. emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is the transfer of emo-
tions from individual to individual (Schoenewolf 1990). A good deal of 
work demonstrates that the emotions of actors in a relationship tend to 
converge over time (Bartel and Saavedra 2000; Totterdell 2000; 
Totterdell et al. 1998). In fact, not only do emotions converge with 
repeated interaction, but Anderson et al. (2003) show that it is the 
low-power actor whose emotion converges toward the high-power 
actor. The implications for repeated exchange are potentially quite 
large. High-power actors who are happy with their resource gains 
may actually promote more happy feelings among low-power actors 
than their outcomes would indicate because their emotions are conver-
ging toward those of the high-power actors. This might serve to 
strengthen the stability or cohesion of unequal power relationships in 
the workplace. Conversely, an unhappy high-power actor, regardless of 
the source of unhappiness, may undermine the cohesion of an unequal 
The power process and emotion 177 
exchange relationship and even set off conflict spirals similar to those 
studied by O'Connor and Arnold (2001). Future work should address 
more systematically the contagion effects that can occur when people 
interact and exchange to achieve collective goals. 
Experiencing power: approach/avoidance processes 
Recent work in psychology has used approach/avoidance theory to 
examine how the experience of power affects the propensity toward 
initiating action to deal with a problem or issue. In terms of the 
power-process model, such power-to-action effects capture a process 
underlying the potential-to-use link. Approach/inhibition work seeks 
to understand when action is actually undertaken to use power. The 
approach/inhibition theory of power is inspired in part by the work of 
Kipnis (1976) in that it is concerned with how the possession of power 
affects the behavior of the power-holder (see Keltner et al. 2003 for a 
review). 
Put simply, the theory argues that the environment of high-power 
actors consists of more rewards, opportunities, and freedom. Because 
high-power agents are enmeshed in a reward-rich environment, with 
substantial opportunities for and freedom of action, approach-related 
tendencies are automatically and subconsciously activated (see Keltner 
et al. 2003 for a review). These approach tendencies are in turn associated 
with automatic cognition, attention to rewards, and a propensity toward 
action. Conversely, the environment of low-power actors consists of less 
freedom, fewer opportunities, and more threat which automatically and 
subconsciously trigger inhibition-related tendencies. These inhibition ten-
dencies, in turn, are associated with systematic cognition, attention to 
threats, and a propensity away from action. Important for our purposes, 
approach tendencies are also associated with positive emotion (Davidson 
1992; Higgins 1997) whereas inhibition tendencies are associated with 
negative emotion (Carver and White 1994). Thus, elevated power leads to 
the experience and expression of positive emotions, and decreased power 
leads to the experience and expression of negative emotions. 
This work predicts overall that individuals with high-power potential 
will be more likely to use their power than low-power individuals. Similarly, 
affect/emotion enters the power process at the power-potential stage 
of the power-process model. Those high in power potential are also 
high in positive affect and they express those emotions more freely than 
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those low in potential power. Galinsky et al. (2003) found support for 
the predicted power-to-action effects - namely that individuals primed 
with high power and given more potential power in terms of their ability 
to allocate resources were more likely than those who lacked power to 
take action to solve a problem. However, this work did not specifically 
address the emotions involved. Work by Anderson and Berdahl (2002), 
however, found that individuals assigned to a high-power position on 
a committee determining resource allocations, experienced approach 
tendencies and positive emotions while individuals assigned to a low-
power committee position experienced inhibition tendencies and nega-
tive emotion. Similarly, Berdahl and Martorana (2006) found that 
high-power actors did experience and express more positive emotions 
and less anger than did low-power actors in a controversial group 
conversation. Thus, research suggests that the mere experience of high 
and low power potential has relevant implications for both the power-
potential-to-power-use connection as well as the power-potential-to-
emotion connection. While there is growing support for the predictions 
of the approach/inhibition theory of power in general (e.g., Galinsky 
et al. 2003), the investigation of the power-to-emotion predictions have 
only recently begun. 
Viewing work on approach/inhibition theory from the power-
process model, one limitation is that although this research does focus 
on when power potential may lead to power use, it does not predict 
which tactics will be chosen when power is used. For example, because 
high-power actors are also in a more positive affective state, is it the case 
that they are more likely to engage in positive tactics than low-power 
actors in a relationship? Conversely, because low-power actors are in a 
negative affective state, are they prone to select negative or punishing 
strategies? This is suggested by Molm's (1997) work. Whereas one 
advantage of this literature over the exchange tradition is that it 
specifically theorizes and empirically examines the power-potential-to-
power-use connection, exchange theory does a better of job of connect-
ing power use to results and results to emotions. These two theoretical 
approaches are complementary, and emotional processes may be a 
point of integration. For example, the results or outcomes of exchange 
may generate approach or inhibition tendencies, as well as the posses-
sion or experience of power potential. 
Another limitation of the approach/avoidance approach to power is 
its strong focus on unequal power relationships. The experience of 
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power is based on having more power than someone else. This emphasis 
on unequal power ignores the non-zero-sum implications of power-
dependence theory. Because the total power in a relationship may 
vary, individuals may experience equal power relationships, yet the 
individual actors may still be prone to feeling high or low power. A 
potentially important question is whether this type of relationship 
translates into the approach/inhibition emotion tendencies described 
by Keltner et al. (2003). In other words, are the effects of relative and 
total power consistent with each other? Under higher total power, will 
both actors have approach tendencies, whereas under lower total power 
will they both have inhibition tendencies? Questions such as these 
would move forward research on the experience of power and emotion 
but could also tie this research more closely to the exchange tradition 
and potentially create other opportunities for cross-fertilization. 
Emotions as a basis for power 
Recently, a small body of negotiation research has examined emotions 
as tactics. The orienting idea is that emotions or emotional expressions 
can be used strategically or tactically to produce desired outcomes 
(Frank 1988), thus resulting in increased or decreased power. 
Applying our power-process model, the focus here is on the use-
to-realized-power link. This research tends to involve one-shot negotia-
tions and emphasize realized power, that is, resources produced as a 
result of negotiation. Thus, the evidence on increasing or decreasing 
power is indirect, since the emotion-to-power-potential effects presume 
that realized power in a single negotiation carries over to subsequent 
negotiations or exchanges. Assuming that an increase in realized power 
does carry meaning for subsequent exchanges, there are two relevant 
issues addressed by this literature: (a) value-creation as a result of 
experiencing emotions and (b) value-claiming as a result of emotional 
displays. Each is briefly discussed below. 
With regard to value creation, a seminal study by Carnevale and Isen 
(1986) found that negotiators primed with positive affect, via the read-
ing of humorous cartoons, communicated more openly, assessed the 
other's priorities more accurately, and created more value (i.e. had more 
integrative agreements) than negotiators not primed with positive 
affect. These results have been replicated (Baron 1990; Forgas 1998; 
Kramer et al. 1993) and extended to show that negative affect 
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correspondingly reduces joint outcomes (Allred et al. 1997). This work 
was extended further in an important way by Anderson and Thompson 
(2004), who showed that, in unequal power relations, it is the high-
power negotiator's positive emotion that leads to a better integrative 
outcome, not the emotions of the low-power negotiator. Overall, inter-
preting integrative outcomes as realized total power, the experience of 
positive and negative affect appears to play a central and important role 
in how much total power a relationship develops, but this is due 
primarily to the emotion or affect of the high-power negotiator. 
Turning to the claiming of value in negotiations, research consistently 
finds that the display of negative emotion in the form of anger results in 
the successful claiming of more resources. For example, Van Kleef et al. 
(2004) found that in computer-mediated negotiations, information 
about a counterpart's angry emotional state led negotiators to make 
fewer demands of and more concessions to their counterpart than when 
information about a counterpart's positive emotions were made avail-
able. Importantly however, Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) show that this 
effect is moderated by the power positions of the negotiators. Low-
power negotiators concede more to an angry counterpart but there are 
no significant effects for anger display on high power counterparts (Van 
Kleef et al. 2006). Thus, because high-power negotiators can gain more 
power and low-power negotiators can lose power via displays of anger, 
as a strategic tool, anger most likely serves to further exacerbate power 
inequalities rather than balance power relationships. In sum, the evi-
dence from the negotiations literature suggests that negative emotions 
(in particular anger) are often effective tactics for generating realized 
power, whereas positive emotions are effective tactics for creating joint 
value. These broad implications are generally consistent with social-
exchange research on power and emotion in the relational cohesion 
tradition (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). 
Conclusions 
Understanding the relationships of power and emotion is in its infancy, 
despite significant growth of attention in the fields of sociology, psych-
ology, and organizational behavior. To date, emotion has served 
primarily as an explanatory mechanism for other processes, such as 
the emergence of commitment in social exchange (e.g., Lawler and 
Yoon 1996) or as an ancillary consequence or byproduct of power 
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relations (e.g., Keltner et al. 2003). Using our power-process model as a 
framework, it is clear that many questions remain unanswered and 
there are gaps to be filled, theoretically and empirically. It is also clear 
how disparate work on specific links of the power process model can fit 
together and be interrelated. There are good reasons for having distinct 
theories and research on particular parts of the model (e.g., power to 
action, tactics to power, outcomes to power potential), but it is also 
important to have a broader framework for integrating distinct lines of 
work. Future research should theorize more systematically the inter-
relationships of these component parts of the power-process model. The 
distinct moments of our power-process model suggest a wide range of 
issues and questions to be dealt with in future work. We hope this paper 
will help to encourage more sustained and systematic attention to the 
multitude of ways that power and emotion are intertwined. 
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